Control & Crisis in Colonial Kenya: The Dialectic of Domination

By Bruce Berman | Go to book overview

unthinkable in 1954 was logical and compelling by 1960 -- dispossession of the settlers, an end to direct colonial domination, and as rapid a transfer as possible of state power and key sectors of the agrarian economy to an African dominant class. Even so, considerable effort was expended by the metropolitan state and capital during the 1960-2 period in ultimately futile efforts to find a multiracial formula that would preserve a public political role for Europeans in an independent Kenya. Meanwhile, persistent (if largely groundless) European fears over the devotion of African nationalists to capitalist forms of property and production led to extensive efforts to erect internal and external constraints on radical change that were to a great extent probably unnecessary. Despite the emergence of a general strategy of decolonization, considerable bargaining, temporizing and fumbling false starts ensued before viable institutional arrangements were forged, and the working out of these arrangements was not completed, as in the settlement schemes and the transfer of the rest of the 'White' highlands into African hands, until the 1970s.

The transformation of Kenya into a 'developing nation' was thus partially an unintended conjuncture and partially an intended outcome that emerged from the interplay of structural change and political struggle. In the course of the changes in internal structure and external position in the world system that this involved, the settlers and the political control apparatus of the colonial state began to be displaced when they had become an obstacle to the further development of capitalist social forces in Kenya. The final irony, perhaps, is that the growing articulation of indigenous peasant and capitalist production with international capital, the expanding presence of advanced multinational industrial capital, and the newly independent state's ties to Britain, the USA and international agencies such as the World Bank meant that by the end of the process of 'decolonization' Kenya was more broadly and tightly integrated into the capitalist world system than it had ever been before.


Notes
1.
Michael Blundell, So Rough a Wind. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1964, pp. 261-2.
2.
See, for example, Carl Rosberg & John Nottingham, The Myth of Mau Mau: Nationalism in Kenya, New York: Praeger, 1966; George Bennett, Kenya: A Political History, London: Oxford University Press, 1963; George Bennett & Carl Rosberg, The Kenyatta Election: Kenya 1960-61, London: Oxford University Press, 1961.
3.
The most important of these studies is Gary Wasserman, Politics of Decolonization:Kenya Europeans and the Land Issue

-417-

Notes for this page

Add a new note
If you are trying to select text to create highlights or citations, remember that you must now click or tap on the first word, and then click or tap on the last word.
One moment ...
Default project is now your active project.
Project items

Items saved from this book

This book has been saved
Highlights (0)
Some of your highlights are legacy items.

Highlights saved before July 30, 2012 will not be displayed on their respective source pages.

You can easily re-create the highlights by opening the book page or article, selecting the text, and clicking “Highlight.”

Citations (0)
Some of your citations are legacy items.

Any citation created before July 30, 2012 will labeled as a “Cited page.” New citations will be saved as cited passages, pages or articles.

We also added the ability to view new citations from your projects or the book or article where you created them.

Notes (0)
Bookmarks (0)

You have no saved items from this book

Project items include:
  • Saved book/article
  • Highlights
  • Quotes/citations
  • Notes
  • Bookmarks
Notes
Cite this page

Cited page

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Sign up now to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

(Einhorn, 1992, p. 25)

(Einhorn 25)

1

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Cited page

Bookmark this page
Control & Crisis in Colonial Kenya: The Dialectic of Domination
Table of contents

Table of contents

Settings

Settings

Typeface
Text size Smaller Larger Reset View mode
Search within

Search within this book

Look up

Look up a word

  • Dictionary
  • Thesaurus
Please submit a word or phrase above.
Print this page

Print this page

Why can't I print more than one page at a time?

Full screen
/ 480

matching results for page

Cited passage

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Sign up now to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn, 1992, p. 25).

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn 25)

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences."1

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Cited passage

Thanks for trying Questia!

Please continue trying out our research tools, but please note, full functionality is available only to our active members.

Your work will be lost once you leave this Web page.

For full access in an ad-free environment, sign up now for a FREE, 1-day trial.

Already a member? Log in now.