America's Failure in China, 1941-50

By Tang Tsou | Go to book overview

CHAPTER II

AMERICAN
CONCEPTIONS
AND
CHIESE
REALITIES

A. The Web of American Objectives, Policies, and Assumptions

The main American objective in the Far East during the Pacific war was the unconditional surrender of Japan within an over-all strategy of defeating Germany first.1 As a means to this end, the United States pursued a policy of keeping China in the war in order to make maximum use of her military potential and strategic geographical position in the common war effort. Linked with this policy was another which proved to have farreaching consequences: the policy of making China a great power and treating her as one of the Big Four for the purpose of building a postwar political order in the Far East. "Toward China we had two objectives," wrote Secretary of State Cordell Hull in his Memoirs: "The first was an effective joint prosecution of the war. The second was the recognition and building up of China as a major power entitled to equal rank with the three big Western Allies, Russia, Britain, and the United States, during and after the war, both for the preparation of a postwar organization and for the establishment of stability and prosperity in the Orient."2 Thus, unlike American wartime activities in Europe, the United States did have a polit

____________________
1
Cf. Hanson W. Baldwin, Great Mistakes of the War ( New York: Harper & Bros., 1950).
2
Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull ( New York: Macmillan Co., 1948), II, 1583. The Department of State defined the policy toward China in the following terms: "The principal and immediate objectives of the United States government are to keep China in the war against Japan and to mobilize China's full military and economic strength in the vigorous prosecution of the war.

"The American Government's lone range policy with respect to China is based on the belief that the need for China to be a principal stabilizing factor in the Far East is a fundamental requirement for peace and security in that region" ( Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Hearings an the Institute of Pacific Relations, 82d Cong., 1st and 2d sess. [ 1951-52], p. 2839 [hereafter cited as Institute of Pacific Relations]).

-33-

Notes for this page

Add a new note
If you are trying to select text to create highlights or citations, remember that you must now click or tap on the first word, and then click or tap on the last word.
One moment ...
Project items

Items saved from this book

This book has been saved
Highlights (0)
Some of your highlights are legacy items.

Highlights saved before July 30, 2012 will not be displayed on their respective source pages.

You can easily re-create the highlights by opening the book page or article, selecting the text, and clicking “Highlight.”

Citations (0)
Some of your citations are legacy items.

Any citation created before July 30, 2012 will labeled as a “Cited page.” New citations will be saved as cited passages, pages or articles.

We also added the ability to view new citations from your projects or the book or article where you created them.

Notes (0)
Bookmarks (0)

You have no saved items from this book

Project items include:
  • Saved book/article
  • Highlights
  • Quotes/citations
  • Notes
  • Bookmarks
Notes
Cite this page

Cited page

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Sign up now to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

(Einhorn, 1992, p. 25)

(Einhorn 25)

1

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Cited page

Bookmark this page
America's Failure in China, 1941-50
Settings

Settings

Typeface
Text size Smaller Larger
Search within

Search within this book

Look up

Look up a word

  • Dictionary
  • Thesaurus
Please submit a word or phrase above.
Print this page

Print this page

Why can't I print more than one page at a time?

Full screen
/ 614

matching results for page

Cited passage

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Sign up now to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn, 1992, p. 25).

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn 25)

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences."1

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Cited passage

Welcome to the new Questia Reader

The Questia Reader has been updated to provide you with an even better online reading experience.  It is now 100% Responsive, which means you can read our books and articles on any sized device you wish.  All of your favorite tools like notes, highlights, and citations are still here, but the way you select text has been updated to be easier to use, especially on touchscreen devices.  Here's how:

1. Click or tap the first word you want to select.
2. Click or tap the last word you want to select.

OK, got it!

Thanks for trying Questia!

Please continue trying out our research tools, but please note, full functionality is available only to our active members.

Your work will be lost once you leave this Web page.

For full access in an ad-free environment, sign up now for a FREE, 1-day trial.

Already a member? Log in now.