Regulation and Protectionism under GATT: Case Studies in North American Agriculture

By Andrew Schmitz; Garth Coffin et al. | Go to book overview

access commitments, which ensure that a minimum amount of imports will always be brought in under supply management, the import share would erode since a dollar taken away from importers would translate into $1.59 for producers.


Conclusions

This chapter proposes two alternative hypotheses as to why import shares in Canadian supply-managed industries have remained relatively low. The first is that producers and importers have equal and effective say in the political process, implying that production and import levels that are currently observed reflect the equilibrium outcome of an unconstrained quantity-setting game between producers and importers. Using both the Cournot-Nash and Stackleberg behavioral specifications and alternative assumptions about the competitive supply and demand elasticities, it is shown that for relatively low competitive import shares of less than 20%, the equilibrium level of imports without competition would exceed the competitive level of imports. Since this outcome appears highly unlikely for the case of Canadian supply management, this hypothesis is rejected.

The second hypothesis is that import levels have remained low because the political cost of transferring rents to importers at the expense of producers is too high. This hypothesis seems much more credible because it is calculated that a dollar of rents transferred to importers by increasing the import quota results in a $1.59 loss for producers. Clearly, one has to treat this result with caution because a number of rather strong assumptions were made during the derivation of this number. Nevertheless, the basic idea that producers stand to lose considerably at the margin when import quotas are increased is probably a reasonable explanation as to why importers have not been more successful at achieving higher rents in the Canadian supply-managed industries.


Notes
1.
Chicken imports have a guaranteed share of approximately 7.5%, and the share for butter is less than 5% (Schmitz, de Gorter and Schmitz, 1994).
2.
For a model of supply management, see Vercammen and Schmitz ( 1992). "Supply Management and Import Concessions". Canadian Journal of Economics 25: 957-71.
3.
In supply-managed industries, a number of factors including rising input costs may be responsible for an upward-sloping, industry supply curve, implying that the area above this curve may not correspond to the rents earned by producers. We ignore this distinction in the current analysis.
4.
Although not illustrated, an analogous conflict arises over the optimal level of

-76-

Notes for this page

Add a new note
If you are trying to select text to create highlights or citations, remember that you must now click or tap on the first word, and then click or tap on the last word.
One moment ...
Default project is now your active project.
Project items

Items saved from this book

This book has been saved
Highlights (0)
Some of your highlights are legacy items.

Highlights saved before July 30, 2012 will not be displayed on their respective source pages.

You can easily re-create the highlights by opening the book page or article, selecting the text, and clicking “Highlight.”

Citations (0)
Some of your citations are legacy items.

Any citation created before July 30, 2012 will labeled as a “Cited page.” New citations will be saved as cited passages, pages or articles.

We also added the ability to view new citations from your projects or the book or article where you created them.

Notes (0)
Bookmarks (0)

You have no saved items from this book

Project items include:
  • Saved book/article
  • Highlights
  • Quotes/citations
  • Notes
  • Bookmarks
Notes
Cite this page

Cited page

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Sign up now to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

(Einhorn, 1992, p. 25)

(Einhorn 25)

1

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Cited page

Bookmark this page
Regulation and Protectionism under GATT: Case Studies in North American Agriculture
Table of contents

Table of contents

  • Title Page iii
  • Contents v
  • Acknowledgments vii
  • About the Editors and Contributors ix
  • Section One - Overview of the Effects of Gatt 1
  • 1 - Itroduction: Trade and Regulations in Transition 3
  • References 18
  • 2 - Post-Gatt Assessment of the World Marketplace 20
  • Notes 35
  • 3 - Consequences of Tariffication 37
  • References 50
  • 4 - Supply Management Under Minimum Import Access Requirements 51
  • Notes 62
  • References 62
  • 5 - Imports into Canada: Why Have They Remained Low? 64
  • Notes 76
  • References 77
  • Section Two - Case Studies of Gatt's Effects 79
  • 6 - Regulation -- the Us Dairy Industry 81
  • References 94
  • 7 - Cost Competitiveness in the Canadian and Us Dairy Industries 96
  • Notes 115
  • References 116
  • 8 - Supply Management and Vertical Coordination: the Role of Cooperatives 118
  • Notes 126
  • References 127
  • 9 - Value-Added Economic Potential 128
  • Notes 145
  • References 146
  • 10 - Tobacco Supply Management: Examples from the United States and Australia 147
  • References 158
  • 11 - Gatt and the Us Peanut Market 160
  • Notes 178
  • References 179
  • 12 - The Us Sugar Industry: the Free Trade Debate 180
  • Notes 199
  • References 201
  • Section Three - Regulation and Supply Management 203
  • 13 - Supply Management Canadian Style 205
  • Notes 221
  • References 223
  • 14 - Power Relationships in the Political Process 226
  • Notes 241
  • References 244
  • 15 - Provincialism: Problems for the Regulators and the Regulated 245
  • References 267
  • 16 - Provmcial Versus Centralized Pricing: Protectionism and Institutional Design 269
  • References 283
  • 17 - Venturing into the Political Market 284
  • Notes 296
  • 18 - Vertical and Horizontal Coordination 299
  • Notes 312
  • References 313
  • 19 - Will the Supply Management Cartel Stand? 314
  • Notes 330
  • References 330
  • About the Book 332
  • Index 333
Settings

Settings

Typeface
Text size Smaller Larger Reset View mode
Search within

Search within this book

Look up

Look up a word

  • Dictionary
  • Thesaurus
Please submit a word or phrase above.
Print this page

Print this page

Why can't I print more than one page at a time?

Full screen
/ 341

matching results for page

Cited passage

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Sign up now to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn, 1992, p. 25).

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn 25)

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences."1

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Cited passage

Welcome to the new Questia Reader

The Questia Reader has been updated to provide you with an even better online reading experience.  It is now 100% Responsive, which means you can read our books and articles on any sized device you wish.  All of your favorite tools like notes, highlights, and citations are still here, but the way you select text has been updated to be easier to use, especially on touchscreen devices.  Here's how:

1. Click or tap the first word you want to select.
2. Click or tap the last word you want to select.

OK, got it!

Thanks for trying Questia!

Please continue trying out our research tools, but please note, full functionality is available only to our active members.

Your work will be lost once you leave this Web page.

For full access in an ad-free environment, sign up now for a FREE, 1-day trial.

Already a member? Log in now.