Public Perception: Abysmal Failure The government was eventually able to mobilize a massive relief operation to help the storm victims in south Florida. In so doing, the federal government provided an unprecedented amount of assistance to the Hurricane Andrew victims. Despite these efforts, however, the public's perception of the govern- mental effort was primarily negative ( Walden 1992). The government did not react quickly, and it did not respond immediately to this disaster situation, even though thousands of storm victims lacked critical life-sustaining supplies. Local citizens were forced to take matters into their own hands because the government did not provide effective guidance or support. Even when the government did respond, it did not act in a coordinated or unified manner. This created further delays in the administration of disaster assistance. The national government is widely believed to be primarily responsible for the apparently poor performance of the disaster-relief system. Local and state governments were completely overwhelmed; only the federal govern- ment had the resources and the authority to handle a disaster of this magni- tude. But, to paraphrase the aforementioned quote from a local emergency management director, where the hell was the cavalry? More specifically, where was FEMA? Unfortunately, FEMA was both unable and unwilling to respond quickly and effectively to this disaster. Once again -- just as in South Carolina following Hugo, FEMA, not the hurricane, was considered to be the real disaster ( Lippman 1992b). 4 The entire governmental response was regarded as a complete failure. Notes | 1 | Most of the material on the origin and movement of Hurricane Andrew was obtained from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (U.S. Department of Commerce 1993). | | | | | 2 | For a more complete description of the military's role during the Hurricane An- drew relief efforts in south Florida, see the U.S. General Accounting Office Report (1993a) Disaster Assistance: DOD's Support for Hurricanes Andrew and Iniki and Typhoon Omar. As the title implies, this report also contains information on the military's efforts in several other disaster situations. | | | | | 3 | There are several excellent newspaper articles on the inability of the federal government's relief agencies, particularly FEMA, to respond quickly and effectively to the situation in south Florida. See, for example, Davis (1992a, 1992b), Lippman (1992a, 1992b), Kilborn ( 1992), and Claiborne (1992a, 1992b). | | | | | 4 | Criticism of the government's actions during this disaster led to a series of investi- gations into and analyses of the federal response system. See, for example, U.S. House ( 1993), U.S. Senate (1993b, 1993c), U.S. General Accounting Office (1993b), Federal Emergency Management Agency ( 1993), and the National Academy of Public Adminis- tration ( 1993). | | | | -101- |