On Disarmament: The Role of Conventional Arms Control in National Security Strategy

By Ralph A. Hallenbeck; David E. Shaver et al. | Go to book overview

internal composition of military units). NATO has also called for storing a substantial quantity of the TLI, which would permit both NATO and the WTO to reduce dramatically the number of personnel each currently requires in its active, fully manned units.

The proposals of many defensive restructuring advocates are focused on substituting manpower-intensive infantry units for existing tank and artillery units--a possibility that most military leaders on both sides have examined and found wanting. To be sure, the WTO has proposed thin-out zones along the IGB, which would imply at least some Pact readiness to defend its side of the border area with only infantry and obstacles. For a variety of military, geographic, and political reasons, however, NATO is unlikely to accept the Pact thin-out zone proposal, and neither side has indicated any willingness to broaden the concept to include a larger area (as the more radical defensive restructuring proposals would suggest is necessary). Nor has either side been willing to substitute massive barrier plans for armored forces.

Finally, some members of the North Atlantic Alliance are at least looking at the possibility that logistical depots and logistical force structure may hold the key to a restructuring proposal that would be militarily significant and acceptable to both sides. As Napoleon once noted, armies do indeed "travel on their stomachs." Given the logistical consumption levels of modern armies, this truth appears to be even more valid today than in Napoleon's time. On the other hand, constraints on logistical elements appear to present special problems for arms control solutions, and these would have to be overcome before either NATO or the WTO would be willing to address such proposals seriously in CFE.


NOTES
1.
The current NATO strategy cannot be executed, regardless of the threat, without a certain minimum force density. For estimates of the size of the necessary minimum, see Stephen J. Flanagan and Andrew Hamilton, "Arms Control and Stability in Europe," Survival, pp. 455-56, who determine that 30 front line divisions and 10 divisions for operational reserves are required, and Captain Daniel M. Gerstein, "In Search of NATO's Minimum Force Density Requirement," in Chapter 2 of this book.
2.
Recent public opinion polling shows that most Europeans do not perceive a military threat from the Warsaw Pact. See, as an example, "West European Publics Counsel Caution in Responding to the Gorbachev United Nations Speech, Yet Confidence in the Soviet Union Continues to Rise," Research Memorandum, U.S. Information Agency, December 20, 1988, p. 1.
3.
Jim Stewart, "Alliance Confronts New Adversary: Public Opinion," The Atlanta Journal and the Atlanta Constitution, April 2, 1989, p. 1.
4.
Demographic constraints to NATO's force structure are briefly discussed in Hans Gunter Brauch , "West German Alternatives for Reducing Reliance on Nuclear Weapons," in Rethinking the Nuclear Weapons Dilemma in Europe, ed. by P. Terrence Hopmann and Frank Barnaby, New York: St Martin's Press, 1988, pp. 146-82. For more intensive analyses of constraints on NATO's strategy, see Hans Gunter Brauch and RobertKennedy

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On Disarmament: The Role of Conventional Arms Control in National Security Strategy
Table of contents

Table of contents

  • Title Page iii
  • Contents vii
  • Figures, Maps, and Tables ix
  • Foreword xi
  • 1- Background 1
  • Notes 15
  • 2- Objectives 19
  • Notes 37
  • 3- Procedures 39
  • From Issues to Policies: the Nato High Level Task Force 47
  • From Issues to Policies: the Nato High Level Task Force 50
  • 4- Issues 53
  • Notes 69
  • 5- Definitional Disarmament 71
  • Notes 76
  • 6- Current Cfe Negotiations 79
  • Notes 106
  • 7- Verification 109
  • 8- Current Csbm Negotiations 121
  • Notes 128
  • 9- Future Environment 129
  • Conclusion 138
  • Conclusion 139
  • 10- Alternative Defenses 143
  • Assessing Proposals for Deep Reductions And Defensive Restructuring Following Cfe 154
  • Assessing Proposals for Deep Reductions And Defensive Restructuring Following Cfe 164
  • 11- Risks, Results, and Reflections 167
  • Notes 182
  • Appendix A: Mandate for Negotiation On Conventional Armed Forces in Europe 183
  • Appendix B: Nato Chapter One 189
  • Appendix C: Nato Chapter Two 193
  • Appendix D: Nato Chapter Three 197
  • Appendix E: Western Csbm Proposal 205
  • Glossary 213
  • Bibliography 217
  • Index 223
  • About the Editors and Contributors 227
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