Article 2 of the genocide treaty offers such a broad definition that virtually
any political violence directed against a "national, ethnical, racial or religious group" qualifies as genocide. While the ethical intent is laudable, it is
unlikely that most states will act according to such an expansive definition.
As in the analysis of war, where one finds distinctions among light,
medium, and heavy casualties, the analysis of political killing of unarmed
civilians requires rough distinctions in the scale of death. Even in a world
where civilian deaths have been measured in the hundreds of thousands,
the killing of tens of thousands or even thousands may be sufficient to
induce mass flight.
4. The initial flow of refugees from the Pakistani crackdown consisted of Bengali Muslims, but the composition quickly shifted to 80 percent Hindu. See
also Jackson ( 1975, 75-76), who concurs with the suspicions of Indian officials. By June nearly seven million refugees had reached India. 5. See Zayas 1977 (104), in which he writes, "Transports into the Western
zones in the summers of 1946 and 1947 were relatively organized and gave
rise to considerably fewer casualties." Elsewhere he notes, "If there had
been no 'organized transfers' and if all the Germans had been expelled in
the brutal manner that characterized the 1945 expulsions, the loss of life
attributable to the flight and expulsion would not have been 2 million but
perhaps 3 million or even more" (124). See also Zayas 1994, 113-16. 6.
The opposite can happen. Apparently, during Desert Storm, civilians occasionally moved toward the sights and sounds of battle because that was the
best way to find the coalition troops who might be prevailed upon for protection or sustenance.
In his memoir of service in Vietnam, Tobias Wolff writes, "You could never
have too many mines. Fifty thousand wouldn't have been too many for me.
Given the chance, I'd have lived smack in the middle of a minefield twenty
miles wide" (1994, 17).
8. See especially McGrath 1994, 126 and app. 3. "In some areas virtually all
mountain grazing land was remotely mined and the whole agricultural
infrastructure brought to a halt by the widespread mining" (156). 9.
A variant on this solution would be to arm the victims so extensively that
they could repel the side whose actions had precipitated or were about to
precipitate mass flight. The practical question is whether or not military
assistance can be delivered quickly enough to affect the actions that produce refugees. Generally, the provision of weapons alone is unlikely to
prove an expeditious solution to refugee problems, in that the victims are
probably in trouble because their military organization is weak or nonexistent. Weapons alone do not an army make.
11. See Durch 1993a, 315-52. Special Representative Dayal called it "massive
intervention in the guise of non-intervention" (346).
Questia, a part of Gale, Cengage Learning. www.questia.com
Book title: Migrants, Refugees, and Foreign Policy:U.S. and German Policies toward Countries of Origin.
Contributors: Rainer Münz - Editor.
Publisher: Berghahn Books.
Place of publication: Providence, RI.
Publication year: 1997.
Page number: 313.
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