See the episode in Story of O discussed in Silverman 1984: 341; de Lauretis 1984: 150.
The position I have adopted here follows Haraway 1985 but speaks with the voices of
many others, including E. Kaplan 1983, Kappeler 1986, de Lauretis 1984, Rubin 1984, Silverman 1984. The positions being critiqued are those of the antipornography movement
and anyone else who ignores her or his own patriarchal origins.
This position is especially well articulated by Haraway 1985. It is also implied in the
analyses of Carse 1986 and de Lauretis 1986 and resembles the positions of Cixous 1986 and Irigaray 1985. By theorizing a genderless subject, I do not mean to imply that our political
projects as men and women are identical or even similar. As Nancy Miller argues ( 1986), the
postmodemist dislocation and dispersal of the author does not work for women because we
have been "juridically excluded from the polis, and hence decentered, 'disoriginated,' deinstitutionalized, etc. [and as a consequence our] relation to integrity and textuality, desire
and authority is structurally different from men's."
I am using these terms in their lay sense. The term sadistic is intended to describe
anyone who derives pleasure in and from the degradation of others; masochistic alternatively
describes those who derive pleasure from (and through their guilt facilitate) their own degradation.
My reading here is a fictionalized rereading of the cyborg manifesto (
De Lauretis 1984: 133; while the primary signification of these words in her account is
somewhat different (in its immediate focus on the ways "fucking" does not work for men),
the conclusions she draws (that it is and is not working for us) are the same.
Haraway (also) observes ( 1985: 75), "White women, including socialist feminists,
discovered . . . the non-innocence of the category 'woman.' That consciousness changes the
geography of all previous categories. . . . In the fraying of identities and in the reflexive
strategies for constructing them, the possibility opens for weaving something other than a
shroud for the day after the apocalypse that so prophetically ends salvation history."
Voice 3 owes much to the writings of Donna Haraway and Teresa de Lauretis. I have
named her Diotima to counter the erotic tales about love attributed by Plato to the Diotima he
Voice I speaks for herself. However, she sounds like Lacan,
Kaja Silverman (esp. Silverman 1984), and anyone else who, like them, situates our subjectivity within the parameters of the "grammar," "morphology," and "syntax" of (male-produced) language and
representation. Voice I also speaks from within the male-produced fictions of and about Aspasia. Because of her epistemological "faith" in the power of discourse to define and
delimit our subject status, I have (to some extent) written her as she has been read by Aristophanes ( Ach.515-29), Plato ( Menex.235e), Aristotle ( Ath. Pol. 26.4), Plutarch ( Per. 24.6, 25.1, 37.5), Xenophon ( Mem. 2.6.36; Oec. 3.14), Eupolis (frg. 274 K), and others.
This line, from Pericles' Funeral Oration ( Thucydides 2.45.2), was attributed to Aspasia by Socrates in Plato ( Menex.236b).
" Aspasia's" foreign birth, status, beauty, and seductive charm figure in most of the
male-produced accounts of her--including Aristophanes ( Ach.515-29), Plato ( Menex. 235e), Athenaeus ( Deip. 13.589d), Plutarch ( Per. 24.6).
Others have illustrated how tragic discourse and the spectacles it effected served the
Athenian male state; thus, as Winkler observes ( 1985b), the tragic gaze is male, as is the self
at stake ( Zeitlin 1985a: 66).
See Eum., especially lines 734-43, where she becomes the mouthpiece for the