The Politics of Miscalculation in the Middle East

By Richard Bordeaux Parker | Go to book overview
Save to active project

Appendix
With the exception of document 1, which is from the LBJ Library in Austin, Texas, and documents 5 and 6, which are from the United Nations Archives, the documents in this appendix were obtained by the author from declassified files of the U.S. Department of State.
DOCUMENT 1
CIA report, June 1967 (TDCS-314/08242-67)Subject: Soviet official's comments on Soviet policy on the Middle Eastern WarSource: A medium level Soviet official
1 The Soviet told . . . there had been "miscalculations" by the Soviets and by the Arabs. The Soviets overestimated the Arabs' ability to employ their substantial military strength against the Israelis while the Arabs overrated their own strength and underrated the Israeli military capability and determination to win. When source asked if that meant that the Soviets had encouraged the Arabs in their hostile attitude toward Israel, the Soviet replied affirmatively, stating that the USSR had wanted to create another trouble spot for the United States in addition to that already existing in Vietnam. The Soviet aim was to create a situation in which the US would become seriously involved economically, politically, and possibly even militarily and in which the US would suffer serious political reverses as a result of its siding against the Arabs. This grand design, which envisaged a long war in the Middle East, misfired because the Arabs failed completely and the Israeli blitzkrieg was so decisive. Faced with this situation the Soviets had no alternative but to back down as quickly and gracefully as possible so as not to appear the villains of the conflict.
2 The Soviet thought that Nasser "must go" and that he would "most probably" be assassinated in the near future by his own disillusioned people. He said that Nasser's charge that US and British aircraft had aided the Israeli forces was a desperate attempt to save face in the Arab world after suffering a humiliating military defeat and that no one, certainly not the USSR, believed the charge. In a final comment, the Soviet said the war has shown that the Arabs are incapable of unity even when their vital interests are at stake.

DOCUMENT 2
Department of State telegram no. 194188, from Secretary of State to U.S. Embassy, Cairo, May 15, 1967
1 Chargé should return to FonMin soonest and state USG (U.S. Government) greatly concerned at increase in tension and resulting military movements.
2 Chargé should inform FonMin that we have urged restraint in strong terms at highest level Israel Government. We have cautioned against unsettling effects of threatening statements made by GOI (Government of Israel) leaders. We are

-224-

Notes for this page

Add a new note
If you are trying to select text to create highlights or citations, remember that you must now click or tap on the first word, and then click or tap on the last word.
Loading One moment ...
Project items
Notes
Cite this page

Cited page

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Sign up now to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

Cited page

Bookmark this page
The Politics of Miscalculation in the Middle East
Settings

Settings

Typeface
Text size Smaller Larger
Search within

Search within this book

Look up

Look up a word

  • Dictionary
  • Thesaurus
Please submit a word or phrase above.
Print this page

Print this page

Why can't I print more than one page at a time?

While we understand printed pages are helpful to our users, this limitation is necessary to help protect our publishers' copyrighted material and prevent its unlawful distribution. We are sorry for any inconvenience.
Full screen
/ 273

matching results for page

Cited passage

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Sign up now to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

Cited passage

Welcome to the new Questia Reader

The Questia Reader has been updated to provide you with an even better online reading experience.  It is now 100% Responsive, which means you can read our books and articles on any sized device you wish.  All of your favorite tools like notes, highlights, and citations are still here, but the way you select text has been updated to be easier to use, especially on touchscreen devices.  Here's how:

1. Click or tap the first word you want to select.
2. Click or tap the last word you want to select.

OK, got it!

Thanks for trying Questia!

Please continue trying out our research tools, but please note, full functionality is available only to our active members.

Your work will be lost once you leave this Web page.

For full access in an ad-free environment, sign up now for a FREE, 1-day trial.

Already a member? Log in now.

Are you sure you want to delete this highlight?