be public policy at a given time, or from what is in a given instance
understood to be convenient. ¹ This, perhaps, is a major lesson of
this book.

In chronicling the changes in the law of libel, this volume is
divided into nine chapters. Chapter one deals with the early de-
velopment of libel in the United States under Supreme Court in-
terpretations that the First Amendment prevented only the national
government--not the states--from interfering with press freedom.
Chapter two shows a shift in interpretations that resulted, after
World War I, in the Supreme Court's declaring a state's prior re-
straint on libel as unconstitutional and, after World War II, in the
Supreme Court's asserting a power to nullify state libel decisions
that encroached on press freedom. This chapter details how the
Court tied the First and Fourteenth amendments together, some-
what in the following "shorthand" fashion: "Congress shall make
no law . . . abridging freedom of speech, or of the press. . . . nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, with-
out due process of law." The remaining chapters show how the
Court's actions used these constitutional amendments to systemati-
cally nullify state laws.

Specifically, chapter three tells how in 1964 the Warren Court
formulated a nationwide privilege to falsely libel public officials, in
their official conduct, provided publications were not made with
knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of falsity. Chapter four
details how this privilege was reinterpreted to include even libels
about officials' private behavior that affected official conduct, to
include criminal as well as civil libel, and to encompass discussion
of government employees thought to have substantial responsibility
for controlling government issues. Chapter five examines the still
further expansion of this privilege of discussion, short of the know-
ing or reckless falsehood, to public figures. And chapter six re-
counts a series of cases involving editorials, candidates, accusations
of crime, television broadcasts, city council meetings and govern-
ment reports--all of which more clearly defined and explained the
constitutional privilege to discuss public figures and public officials.

Chapter seven discusses an opinion by a deeply divided Court,
after a shift in chief justices, that resulted in a short-lived constitu-
tional privilege for discussion of all individuals involved in public
issues--provided there was no knowing or reckless falsehood.

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