individual policymakers respond to different constituencies and hold divergent
conceptions of the "common good," conflicting career aspirations, and varying
time frames for the achievement of goals. It demonstrates the enormously
frustrating task, always faced by Congress, of prying information loose from the
executive bureaucracy--particularly one under siege.

Despite such handicaps, the intelligence investigation of 1975 succeeded.
Though flawed, the inquiry satisfied the primary standard by which a legislature
must be judged in a democracy: it enhanced the freedom and well-being of the
citizens. The overarching thesis of this study is a reaffirmation of James
Madison's view that fragmentation of power--despite its frustrations--provides
a critical defense against abuse by individual power holders. This is the
paradox--and the genius--of our government. Congressional investigations,
when fairly conducted, have evolved into a vital part of the safeguards wisely
prescribed by the nation's founders to restrain executive power.

This thesis will have its detractors. Some believe the Senate intelligence
investigation had just the opposite effect: that it was an unwarranted exercise in
self-flagellation, a witch-hunt leading to the destruction of the very intelligence
capabilities designed to protect us from foreign and domestic threats. In this
view, therefore, the end result was a decline in the freedom and well-being of our
citizens.

The reader will have to draw his or her own conclusions. My objective is not
one of advocacy. Rather, I seek to lay out the events of this inquiry as carefully as
I can, with all the inevitable limitations involved in such a task. As John Updike
has put it (in "The Blessed Man of Boston"), "from the dew of the few flakes
that melt on our faces we cannot reconstruct the snowstorm. "A more definitive
account of the intelligence investigation will be written only decades from now.
This is an interim report, with the shortcomings that that implies. I can only
hope the study has some compensating virtues, especially freshness of impres-
sion, closeness of observation, and honesty of record. I would also hope that it
might contribute to the continuing national debate on intelligence policy.

My observation post for these events was as a Senate staff assistant, on leave
from university teaching. The investigation was a rare chance for me, as a
political scientist, to compare the textbooks on Congress with the real thing.
During the inquiry, I served both as an investigator for the committee and as an
aide to the chairman, Senator Frank Church, Democrat, Idaho. The latter
position provided a unique perspective, though it obviously raises questions
about my capacity to evaluate the chairman and his committee objectively; I can
only say that I have striven for scholarly detachment. After the investigation, I
served as staff director for the Subcommittee on Intelligence Oversight, U.S.
House of Representatives; this gave me an opportunity to view the "new
oversight" at close hand.

In the interests of readability, I present this study in the first person, and
except for the beginning and concluding chapters, I employ a chronological
style. The use of first - person narrative emphasizes the personal nature of this
odyssey, for here in essence is the saga of a journey I had the opportunity to take

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