by KENT BENDALL

I am gratified by Ferré's substantial agreement with the
epistemological framework I have presented. Many of his
comments and suggestions, including his proposed extension
of the notion of cognitive discourse to cover non-verbal signs,
I either agree with or find promising and fertile. There
nevertheless remain some points of disagreement or misunder-
standing, and my comments here concern mainly these points.
This should not be interpreted as reflecting basic disagree-
ment nor be allowed to obscure the real progress we have
made toward clarifying the problems with which we began.

First a series of brief comments on particular points in
Ferré's discussion:

1. After elucidating and emphasizing the implications of
my position concerning the subordination of the theoretical
activity of reason to the practical demands of life itself, Ferré
points out the consequence that what might appear to be
"self-limitations" or "abdications" of the authority of reason
would not be properly so called. This is quite correct and
worth stressing. Of course no "abdication" of rationality
would be implied by the discovery of rational grounds requir-
ing suspension of certain "orthodoxies of theoretical practice"
(p. 139 ). The essence of critical inquiry is the constant testing

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