any time before? The temptation to rest upon her laurels had
never been so great. And after so long and costly a war, the
feeling of the country yeas fully in sympathy with such relaxation
There has been a tendency among some historians to view this as
the prevailing temper of naval policy throughout the Vienna-
Crimea interlude. The words conservatism, complacency and
stagnation are easily associated with these years, and the custo-
marily unenthusiastic verdict upon the Navy's performance in
the Crimean War seems to bear out the former impressions.
Nevertheless, although conservatism prevailed in many naval
circles, complacency and stagnation ceased to be a practical
policy after 1835, and the best of British sea-dogs, whatever their
other faults, have normally displayed much practical common
sense.

The size and character of the British Navy after 1835 were
matters of keen debate, not merely around the boardroom table of
the Admiralty but in the Cabinet and Parliament. The naval
estimates were almost doubled in the space of ten years, and
after the Crimean War there was no comparable proportionate
increase until 1887-97. By 1854 few warships were being con-
structed without steam power of some sort, however small, while
most warships of any size were being equipped with some shell
guns. It is true that the fleet was evolving into a dead end, for the
Crimean War -was to prove that the future did not lie with enlarged,
steam-assisted versions of the ships which had served Britain so
welt for two centuries, It is true that the naval revolution of the
late fifties and early sixties was to cast an unflattering shadow over
the tentative experiments of naval designers and administrators
before 1854. Nevertheless it would seem from an examination of
the circumstances affecting the Navy and naval development
before the Crimean War that the Admiralty, as far as the matériel
of the fleet was concerned, had performed their duties satis-
factorily.

A second common impression concerning British naval history
between 1815 and 1853 is that Britain had little to fear from naval
rivals. On the contrary, however, for hail of the years under
discussion, Britain was seriously disturbed by first a Russian and
later a French naval challenge. Even in the absence of a 'penny
press', Anglo-French naval rivalry after 1844 bore some re-
semblance to the excitement provoked by the rise of the German

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