But notice two things. First, harmony or accommodation is possible only in suitable liberal regimes. Just as Hegel thought that an individual's reconciliation to the social world was possible only in the modern social world he found in nineteenth-century Germany, so too Green would have to regard the sort of non-competitive common good he seeks as a political good and achievement, not fully within any one individual's control. In fact, Green would have to view a perfectly harmonious common good as an unrealized ideal. One reason for this is the simple fact that some of the requisite liberal reforms had yet to take place in Britain, the United States, and other Western democracies. But another reason for the failure of extreme harmony is the universal character of the common good. Even if extreme harmony would (otherwise) obtain among the members of a suitable liberal regime, it would not obtain for members of non-liberal regimes. But Green believes that the common good is maximally inclusive of all rational agents and that a good cannot be common in which some do not share. Of course, members of liberal regimes may be closer to securing a share of the common good than others, but as long as there are non-liberal regimes, no one—including members of a suitable liberal regime—can enjoy the common good. ³⁶ Requiring, as it would, the universal establishment of liberal institutions, Green's political defence of extreme harmony cannot be judged successful.

But Green has available a metaphysical, as well as a political, defence of extreme harmony.

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