When analysts write about regulatory politics at OSHA, they typi-
cally describe the process as "a product of the ongoing conflict be-
tween labor and management" ¹ in which "the whole burden of
U.S. labor history...has been loaded on OSHA." ² Indeed, it is
said that the very nature of the agency's task generates "continuing
organized conflict" between business and unions. ³ So what are the
prospects for regulatory reform under these circumstances? Not
very good. After all, any meaningful reform must somehow come
to grips with "the sharply different goals held by the agency's op-
posed publics," which is doubtful in light of "the clear, almost pet-
rified, polarization of management and labor." ⁴ The prevailing
view of regulatory politics at OSHA thus stresses one factor above
all -- union-business conflict.

Now consider the origins of the Cooperative Compliance Pro-
gram. Contrary to what the prevailing view would predict, it was
labor and management (construction unions and their employers)
that developed and promoted the CCPtogether while OSHA op-
posed the new policy. Only after a long process of negotiation and
political maneuvering was that opposition overcome and OSHA
agreed to implement the program. But how could this be if regu-
latory politics at OSHA is one of organized conflict? How could it
be that business and unions together came up with the CCP? And

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