David Hume, for instance, argued against this concep-
tion of the dominant status of reason, but he did so
more on the basis of the principles of his epistemology
than by appeal to scientific knowledge of human na-
ture. ² But now the well-worn Platonic view of man has
been undermined by modern science. Biological and
psychological findings have made a progressively
stronger case for the considerable extent to which
human thought and behavior are governed by non-
rational causes. Many have come to accept that desires,
hopes, needs, fears, commitments, and the like make
their own irreducible contribution to the rich texture
of human life, and that the intellectual functions of
human beings should not be considered properly pre-
dominant under all conditions.

Under the impact of nineteenth-century Darwinism,
James was powerfully influenced by a biological model
of human nature. He pictures the human being as a
striving, goal-positing, interest-fulfilling organism,
whose most important characteristic is his volitional
appropriation and projection of ends. Indeed, far from
being like the charioteer holding the passions in line
and determining their appropriate limits, James sees
the rational and cognitive faculties of human beings to
be subservient to the spirited and emotional aspects of
our nature. This means that the venerable intellectual
functions are not self-sufficing or self-justifying, but
are worthwhile only in the context of specific practical
ends. Human consciousness, for James, is thoroughly
teleological. Human cognitive activities -- concept for-
mation, belief acquisition, theory construction, and the
like -- function like tools which are limited and molded
by the individual's preferences, desires, goals, and in-
terests. The individual's goals themselves have the
status of posits on James's view -- they themselves
neither require nor receive justification. Cognitive be-
havior is both motivated and, ultimately, justified by
the individual's own internal and personally appropri-
ated programs. We cannot think about anything with-
out taking some sort of stand about what is desirable:

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