tion of which science is unable to find any finality and the con-
scious acts of men that invariably aim at definite ends. To neglect,
in the treatment of human action, reference to the ends aimed
at by the actors is no less absurd than were the endeavors to
resort to finality in the interpretation of natural phenomena.

It would be a mistake to insinuate that all the errors concern-
ing the epistemological interpretation of the sciences of human
action are to be ascribed to the unwarranted adoption of the
epistemology of positivism. There were other schools of thought
that confused the philosophical treatment of praxeology and
history even more seriously than positivism, e.g., historicism. Yet,
the following analysis deals first of all with the impact of
positivism. ¹

In order to avoid misinterpretation of the point of view of this
essay, it is advisable, even necessary, to stress the fact that it deals
with knowledge, science, and reasonable belief and that it refers
to metaphysical doctrines only as far as it is necessary to demon-
strate in what respects they differ from scientific knowledge. It
unreservedly endorses Locke's principle of "not entertaining any
proposition with greater assurance than the proofs it is built upon
will warrant." The viciousness of positivism is not to be seen in
the adoption of this principle, but in the fact that it does not
acknowledge any other ways of proving a proposition than those
practiced by the experimental natural sciences and qualifies as
metaphysical--which, in the positivist jargon, is synonymous with
nonsensical--all other methods of rational discourse. To expose
the fallaciousness of this fundamental thesis of positivism and to
depict its disastrous consequences is the only theme of this essay.

Although full of contempt for all it considers as metaphysics,
the epistemology of positivism is itself based upon a definite
brand of metaphysics. It is beyond the pale of a rational inquiry
to enter into an analysis of any variety of metaphysics, to try to
appraise its value or its tenability and to affirm or to reject it.
What discursive reasoning can achieve is merely to show whether
or not the metaphysical doctrine in question contradicts what
has been established as scientifically proved truth. If this can be
demonstrated with regard to positivism's assertions concerning

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