glauh, were deemed too swampy to be passable. The ob- served also, that the ground on the hither side, as far as Unterglauh, was sufficiently high to protect the passage of the rivulet, but that the plain beyond the farther bank, on which the troops must form for the attack, was commanded by the eminence occupied by the enemy. To these peculi- arities they adapted their plan. The morning being hitherto partially hazy, the Gallo- Bavarians did not even suspect the approach of the enemy. * Deceived by the intelligence which they had obtained from the prisoners taken on the preceding evening, they detached their cavalry to forage; and being persuaded that the allies were falling back on Nordlingen, they considered the guard which attended Marlborough and Eugene as a body of cavalry pushed forward to cover this retrograde movement. But at seven, the fog dispersing, the heads of Eugene's columns were descried behind Berghausen, and the alarm was instantly given. Signal guns were fired to recall the foragers, and the advanced corps, committing Berghausen, Schwenenbach, and Weilheim to the flames, fell back to the main body. Confusion pervaded the lines, the artillery was hurried forward, and the troops were observed hastening to form at the head of the camp. The Gallo-Bavarian army consisted of 56,000 men † ____________________ | * | If any doubt should remain, that the Gallo-Bavarian commanders were completely surprised, it will be removed by the avowal of Tallard himself, in a postscript to a letter, dated Camp de Leitzheim (the very morning of the battle). "Ce 13, au point du jour les ennemis ont battu la générale à 12 heures, à l'assemblée. On les voit en bataille à la tête do leur camp, at suivant les apparences ils marcheront aujourd'hui. Le bruit du pays eat qu'ils vont à Nordlingen. Si cela est, ils nius laissent entre le Danube et eux; et par conséquent ils auront de la peine à soutenir lea établissements qu'ils ont pris en Bavière." -- Campagnes de Tallard, t. ii. p. 140. From this letter, who could have supposed that in a few hours his whole army would have been defeated, and himself a prisoner? | | † | Tallard admits that his own force consisted of 36 battalions and 44 squadrons, and that of Marsin of 41 battalions and 85 squadrons, besides 5 Bavarian battalions and 23 squadrons posted on the extreme left; in all, 82 battalions and 152 squadrons. Marlborough states them at 82 battalions and 147 squadrons. We have, therefore, perhaps rather under-rated the number by com-, and | -193- |