Disraeli said that he was depressed by the law but exalted by litera-
ture. If he meant that law and literature are disparates, the statement
is without meaning, for the term "literature" is merely a judgment of
the quality of writing. Court proceedings, testimony, arguments, pleas
and judgments, and the discussion of legal theories--all, as I hope the
second volume of this anthology will prove, may be read as literature
if the expression and thought are of a high order. Even statutory law
can attain the level of literature. It was Stendhal's position that there
was only one example of perfect style, and that was the Code Napoléon.

There is no Plimsoll line, to borrow a metaphor from the law, for the
judgment of literature. Great literature should ignite or inspire; but
whether it does depends in part on the reader. I believe each work in-
cluded here met that test when I read it, though in some instances the
flame gave more light than heat. No other test or system was used in
the selection of the material, except that I avoided technical writings
that would not be understood by a reasonably intelligent person un-
trained in the law.

There are of necessity many omissions in this book. Perhaps some-
thing should be said of the inclusion of two opinions of Mr. Justice
Holmes (in addition to his essay and letter), two of Judge Learned
Hand, and none of Mansfield, Jessel, Marshall, Bowen and Bok, or of a
number of the other great writer-judges. The first draft of this anthol-
ogy included three sections that were later deleted; one was devoted to
writing by judges, a second to history and anthropology of the law, and
a third to biographical material. The publisher had contracted for a

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