90,000 men, was to assemble between the Saar and the Moselle, and to commence the siege of Saar Louis, before the French could take the field. Marlborough, with the native and auxiliary troops in the pay of the maritime powers, was to penetrate along the Moselle, while the mar- grave of Baden, with an Austrian force and the contingents of the circles, was to act on the side of the Saar and co-ope- rate in the grand attack. The imperial ministers had solemnly engaged that their forces should be ready to take the field early in the spring, and similar promises were made by the German princes to furnish the requisite horses and artillery. * From his recent success, Marlborough naturally conceived hopes of obtaining the immediate acquiescence of the Dutch. But he found at this time the same weakness of government, the same discordance of views, and the same factious opposi- tion as he had before experienced from the parties in Hol- land. Although eager to repair to the theatre of action, he was detained at the Hague in combating the timid or frivo- lous objections of the government, and his impatience breaks forth in his correspondence. To Lord Godolphin he observes:-- "April 21. -- I cannot but say that almost all their business here is in great disorder, and their generals' desire of keeping 50 battalions and 90 squadrons on the Meuse is very unreasonable; for if this should be com- plied with, I should have on the Moselle but 60 battalions and 79 squad- rons, to act offensively; and at the same time they do not so much as pretend to act otherwise than on the defensive. I am sure I shall never consent to what they desire; but how I shall be able to get the troops ____________________ | * | There appears to have been feebleness and want of enterprise in the conception of the plan of the campaign of 1705. If the enemy were unpre- pared, one would have thought that this was the favourable opportunity for the Confederates to strike a decisive blow by penetrating into the heart of France, in lieu of wasting time in a siege till he was in a better state to receive them. There might be the spirit of chivalry in this delay, but it lacked the spirit of the strategy of a more recent style of warfare. In- deed, it is manifest from this scheme of commencing with the investment of Saar Louis, that neither Eugene nor Marlborough, though undoubt- edly the greatest warriors modern Europe had known, had obtained a glimpse of the art of subjugating kingdoms introduced in the French revolutionary conflicts. Napoleon never lost time in the siege of fron- tier or intermediate places, but dashed at the capital at once; and the allied armies, which conquered him at Leipsic, and rescued Germany from his grasp, followed his example. -- ED | -266- |