of the place, under the direction of Overkirk. Conscious
that the enemy would not venture to risk an engagement,
and disdaining to spend the season of action in defensive
warfare, Marlborough formed the design of forcing the lines,
on which they confidently placed their reliance, and carrying
the war into the heart of the Brabant.

The construction of this formidable barrier, which was
partly natural and partly artificial, had employed the space
of no less than three years. It commenced at Marché aux
Dames, on the Meuse, to the east of Namur, passed by Ger-
bise to Wasseigue on the Mehaigne, and from thence stretch-
ing to the Little Gheet, followed the left bank to Leuwe,
leaving Hanut on the east and Tirlemont on the west. Be-
tween Leuwe and Aerschot, the Great Gheet and the Demer
formed a natural defence, and from Aerschot ran a new series
of intrenchments to Antwerp. On the flanks were the two
fortresses of Namur and Antwerp, and in the interval were
numerous fortified posts, particularly Leuwe, Diest, Sichem,
Aerschot, and Lierre. The French army, amounting to
70,000 men, was posted in such a manner as to draw the
utmost advantage from this extraordinary effort of skill and
labour. Villeroy, with the main body, continued his head-
quarters at Mierdorp, and the rest of the troops were dis-
posed on different parts of the line, between the Great and
Little Gheet, in situations from which they could most rea-
dily assemble in force on the points threatened with an
attack.

To pass a barrier, strengthened with all the resources of
art, covered by rivers and marshes, and defended by an army
superior in numbers, was an enterprise of the boldest and
most critical kind; and Marlborough, therefore, employed
all the powers of his inventive genius to distract the atten-
tion and baffle the combinations of the enemy.

The point which he selected for his intended attack was
between Leuwe and Heilisheim, where the abrupt and slip-
pery banks of the Little Gheet, combined with the artificial
defences, seemed to present a double obstacle to the enter-
prises of an enemy. During the short siege of Huy, he em-
ployed the most effectual means to ascertain the state of the
lines, and the disposition of the hostile army. But though
superior to the military prejudices of the age, which regarded

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