question, he added, "they will at the same time do M. Over-
kirk justice, by informing you that he coincided with me in
opinion, and thought the opportunity too fair to be lost.
However I submitted, though with extreme reluctance." In
a postscript, giving farther scope to his feelings, he observes,
"My heart is so full, that I cannot forbear representing to
your high mightinesses on this occasion, that I find my autho-
rity here to be much less than when I had the honour to
command your troops in Germany."

On the same evening in which he wrote his letter to the
States-general, and from the same place, the deputies issued
what may be called a counter manifesto. In this document
they justified their opposition to the proposed attack, by
declaring that, according to the unanimous opinion of all the
Dutch generals, except Overkirk, the nature of the ground
and the superior force of the enemy, presented insurmount-
able obstacles to so desperate an enterprise as the attempt to
force the passage of the Ische. They even extended their
objections to such petty cavils, as the difficulty of establish-
ing hospitals, or forwarding convoys of bread; and concluded
their justification by an indirect censure on the commander-
in-chief, for concealing from them the real object of his
movements.

"And we hoping that we have fully satisfied the intentions of your
high mightinesses, contained in your resolution of the 5th instant, to
permit the Duke of Marlborough, without holding a council of war, to
make two or three marches, for the execution of some design formed by
his grace; we therefore, for the future, shall regulate our conduct accord-
ing to our instructions and your high mightinesses' resolution of the 26th
of June last, except your high mightinesses should be pleased to send us
farther orders. And we cannot conceal from your high mightineses
that all the generals of our army think it very strange that they should not
have the least notice of the said marches."

As on the former occasion, the French also naturally
availed themselves of this official report, to laud the skill of
their own generals, to magnify the valour of their own troops,
and to reflect on the military talents of the British com-
mander, as if he had been hurried by presumption into an
enterprise which was impracticable, or had been baffled by
the superior tactics and activity of his opponents. In Eng-
land, the enemies of Marlborough, as well as the advocates
for peace, adopted the language and sentiments of this docu-
ment, although it was known to be both partial and false; and

-313-