1845-1846

THE minister had triumphed, and his policy, meagre as
it was, had prevailed. But the nemesis was at hand.
Supreme prejudice and sublime mediocrity were banding
themselves together against the statesman who had
dared for the second time in his career to postpone party
to the State. In the speech quoted in the last chapter
Peel had plainly intimated a doubt whether in the
event of some great crisis--such as war with the United
States over the boundary disputes of the time--he
would remain at the head of affairs. The particular
crisis he foresaw was averted by his own temperate
firmness and that of his Foreign Secretary. But another
crisis was at hand. The corn laws were in extremis.
The power and influence of the anti-Corn-Law League
were advancing by leaps and bounds. Peel himself had
long abandoned protection as a principle, and only
maintained it as a matter of expediency, waiting, no
doubt, until a general election should free him from his
bondage to its supporters. But a policy of expectancy,
always precarious in politics, was, in the economical

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