continue to be faithfully observed by the two great sections of the slaveholding and the non-slaveholding States, there could be no rational cause for anxiety to either of them. The duty which a just regard for the Constitution imposed upon the South was, to refrain from efforts to increase its national political power in the interests of servitude; for such efforts could not be made without exciting angry opposition in the North. The correlative duty that rested upon the North was, to fulfil, exactly and literally, the stipulations by which the Constitution always intended to guard the indi- vidual rights of the master where the Constitution had recog- nized those rights as lawfully existing, and to refrain from all interference with a social relation which was under the ex- clusive control of a local sovereignty, whose independence, in this regard, was fully promised by the fundamental law of the land. But these duties, plain and imperative as they were, were obscured to great numbers of people in the two sections, by the influence which their several acts and exertions produced upon each other. It was easy for a Northern man to see that the slavehold- ing States ought to be content with the guaranties of the Con- stitution, and ought to refrain from seeking new defences for slavery by increasing its political power; but the same man did not see how his own denunciation of this peculiar social rela- tion operated to lead the Southern people in quest of further sectional power as a means of defending themselves against un- warrantable interference. On the other hand, it was quite natural for a Southern slaveholder to perceive, with great dis- tinctness, that the Constitution had secured to him a personal right of extradition of his fugitive slave, and to be indignant at any failure to comply with this obligation; but he did not see so clearly that, in insisting on extending the area of a social relation, elsewhere regarded as odious and morally wrong, he was only increasing a feeling at the North that found its ex- pression in State laws which obstructed the exercise of his con- stitutional right, and at the same time fomented a popular spirit which practically denied its existence. The relation of Mr. Webster to this whole subject cannot -382- |