Kierkegaard and Heidegger will be analysed. That an
understanding of these writers from the point of view of the
problem of Being does not represent an imposition of a
problem foreign to them will, it is hoped, appear from the
chapters discussing their respective views on the subject.
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss some of the prob-
lems that cluster around the concept of Being. A full his-
torical treatment of this concept cannot be attempted here
due to limitations both of space and knowledge. Using
illustrations from various sources, the attempt will be to
formulate a concept that can be used in an analysis of Kierke-
gaard and Heidegger.

At the outset a consideration of the concept of Being
involves a fundamental problem of precedence. What comes
first, the problem of knowledge or the problem of Being?
On the one hand, all statements about Being would have to
be based on cognitive sources which should be analysed
antecedently. On the other hand, all statements of cognition
are some form of the positing of Being. ¹ As something that
is, a statement of cognition is a statement of Being. This
extensiveness of the concept of Being is recognized by
Aristotle when he writes:

Everything that is, then, is said to 'be' in this same way;
each thing that is is said to 'be' because it is a modification of
being qua being or a permanent or a transient state or a
movement of it, or something else of the sort. ²

As a consequence, it would seem that thinking by its very
nature presupposes Being and that it is Being, therefore,
that must be analysed antecedently. The result of this
dilemma is that there are at least two approaches possible
to the basic analysis which is philosophy: that which inquires
after the origin and nature of knowledge and that which

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