ence. The very first line of his main work, "The world is my
idea," is a paraphrase of Kant's conclusion that mind makes
nature possible. Schopenhauer draws further inferences from
this conclusion. The world as idea does not appear as it ulti-
mately is. While Kant admitted this and pointed to the thing-
in-itself as the unknowable "other side" of appearances,
Schopenhauer believed that we actually do have access to this
other side. "The objective world, the world as idea, is not the
only side of the world, but merely its outward side; and it has
an entirely different side--the side of its inmost nature--its
kernel--the thing-in-itself." ¹ And what is this kernel, the
thing-in-itself? "The answer to the riddle is given to the sub-
ject of knowledge who appears as an individual, and the
answer is will." ² Every act of the body becomes objectification
of will by passing into perception. Thus man is in possession
of double knowledge of the nature and activity of his body:
as idea and as will.

Schopenhauer now takes a further step. He uses this double
knowledge of ourselves as "a key to the nature of every phe-
nomenon in nature," and concludes that all bodies are analo-
gous to ours in this respect. In its inner nature every being
and every object must be "the same as that in us which we
call will." Schopenhauer justifies this step by saying that "be-
sides will and idea nothing is known to us or thinkable." ³
Like Whitehead in our times, he sees no reason why we should
not use human experience as providing a clue to the charac-
ter of all entities in the world.

The will is one, eternal, indestructible, almighty. The prin-
ciple of multiplicity and individuation does not apply to the
will itself, but only to its manifestations. They take place in
time and space, and are subject without exception to the law
of causality. However, Schopenhauer insists that the thing-in-
itself, or will, "is present entire and undivided in every object

-viii-