of both Marcuse's and Habermas' work. Both authors have re-
sponded to this change, Habermas somewhat more. I take advan-
tage of this ferment in the philosophy of science, bringing to bear
fairly recent developments in this field (as exemplified by the work
of Thomas Kuhn, Paul Feyerabend, Richard Rorty, W. V. O. Quine,
and Mary Hesse, among others) on the positions of Marcuse and
Habermas. In this sense my work is not what has come to be called
an immanent critique. I believe that Marcuse and Habermas are
mistaken in some of their fundamental assumptions about science.

Marcuse and Habermas both write about science from the per-
spective of the critique of instrumental reason, which was devel-
oped by the intellectual leaders of the Frankfurt School of critical
theory, Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno. This critique ar-
gues that science is part of a larger way of thinking, instrumental
reason, whose roots can be traced back at least to the Odyssey of Homer
, but which came to dominate modern thought during the En-
lightenment. Characteristic of this way of thinking is its orientation
toward nature, and, ultimately, man, as an object to be overcome,
dominated, and exploited. Various quotes from that great popular-
izer of modern science, Francis Bacon, to the effect that science
seeks to "hound," "vex," and "torture" nature in order to gain her
secrets, are frequently employed to lend support to this interpreta-
tion. Part of my argument, drawing upon the contemporary phi-
losophy of science, is simply that modern science philosophically
understands itself in such an open, anarchic, and hermeneutic
fashion that the equation of science with instrumental reason no
longer fits, no matter how thoroughly this equation is modified.

Another part of my argument examines the projects of Marcuse
and Habermas from a perspective much more internal to their own
goals and purposes. The question asked is why and to what pur-
pose each modifies the critique of instrumental reason in the way
he does. I conclude that while there are contradictory themes in
Marcuse's work, his version of the critique of instrumental reason
serves to rhetorically soften his call for humanity's utter triumph
over nature. In contrast to Marcuse's, Habermas' understanding of
science has been received very positively within a number of circles
outside of critical theory. Not only does Habermas seem more rea-
sonable but his position on science has generally kept pace with de-
velopments in the contemporary philosophy of science. Neverthe-
less, I argue that in some respects Habermas' view of science is less
satisfactory than Marcuse's. The way in which Habermas divides

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