other countries, such as Turkey, Iran, and Iraq, the Arab-Israeli issue has
been a less salient political factor. Nonetheless, the signing of the Oslo agree-
ment of September 13, 1993, was a major turning point for all of the Middle
East, and the authors in this book use it as a focal point in their analyses,
which, as in previous books in this series, examine events in the Middle
East from domestic, regional, and external perspectives.

Myron J. Aronoff and Yael S. Aronoff begin with an analysis of the evo-
lution of Israeli policy toward the Palestinians from the election of the La-
bor government in June 1992 until the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin in
November 1995. They argue that the dovish composition of the Labor cabi-
net, and the influence of both Yossi Beilin and Shimon Peres, helped per-
suade Rabin to move toward peace with the Palestinians, despite strong
opposition from militant members of Israel's right wing. They note that
the process of moving toward peace with the Palestinians dramatically
improved Israel's position in the world and made possible the Israeli peace
treaty with Jordan but the authors presciently warned that Rabin's succes-
sor as prime minister, Shimon Peres, had to use the "bully pulpit" of his
office to educate the Israeli public about the importance of the peace pro-
cess to their long-term security and welfare. Peres's failure to do this ad-
equately, coupled with a series of Hamas and Islamic Jihad terrorist at-
tacks against Israelis in February and March 1996, led to his loss in the
election in May 1996 to Likud leader Benyamin Netanyahu.

The impact of the election on the Middle East peace process is dealt
with by Mark Rosenblum. He notes that during the election campaign,
Netanyahu ran more against Arafat than against Peres, and, exploiting the
terrorist attacks, condemned Peres for "subcontracting" Israeli security to
the PLO and the Palestinian authority. At the same time, he sought to win
over the doves in the Israeli electorate by calling for a "secure peace," pledg-
ing to honor previous agreements and to continue the peace process, even
if at a slower pace and with an eye on "security first." Yet on taking office,
Netanyahu appeared to be intent more on reversing than continuing the
peace process. Despite a fractious coalition that included some ministers
more hawkishly and others more dovishly inclined than Netanyahu, he
embarked on a program of enlarging Jewish settlements on the West Bank,
humiliating Arafat, and stalling on the promised redeployment from Heb-
ron. Furthermore, in a move that precipitated major battles between the
Israeli army and armed Palestinian police, Israel's erstwhile allies against
Palestinian terrorism, he secretly arranged for opening a tunnel in Jerusa-
lem running beside the Temple Mount, where the al-Aksa and Dome of
the Rock mosques are located. Whether Netanyahu will be able to recover

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