committed support for his novel form of behaviorism as an essentially closed or
completed system of method, procedures, equipment, and common vocabulary
so that eventually hundreds of psychologists sufficiently identified themselves
as Skinnerians to make this the most visible second "movement" within be-
haviorism. In asserting this, I am agreeing with the editors in their decision to
focus primarily on Watson and Skinner.

This does not mean, of course, that others who influenced behaviorism are
to be ignored. Some were contemporaries with Watson and others were ac-
tive when Skinner entered the field. It may be noted that Pavlov recognized
that some of his ideas resembled Edward L. Thorndike's experimentation and
theorizing. Others influential in American behaviorism included Max F.
Meyer ( 1873-1967) and his student, A. P. Weiss ( 1879-1931), whose book
entitled A Theoretical Basis of Human Behavior ( 1925) was a defense of his
variety of behaviorism from a biosocial standpoint. Another variety of behav-
iorism had been announced by Stevenson Smith and Edwin Guthrie in their
General Psychology in Terms of Behavior ( 1921) and was defended later in
Guthrie The Psychology of Learning ( 1935).

Edward Tolman Purposive Behavior in Animals and Men ( 1932) gave
expression to his form of behaviorism which he thought of as non-Watsonian
because it was "molar" rather than "molecular." He was more sympathetic
toward Skinner's position than to Watson's. Clark L. Hull considered himself
to be an arch-behaviorist as he presented his systematic position in a series of
articles in the Psychological Review, beginning in 1929, and eventually in his
book Principles of Behavior ( 1943), with others to follow.

A mention must also be made of J. R. Kantor, whose two large volumes
Principles of Psychology ( 1924) presented his variety of behaviorism,
later summarized briefly in his "Preface to Interbehavioral Psychology"
( 1942).

This is enough to indicate the existence of considerable turmoil within the
ranks of those who considered themselves behaviorists. At the same time,
many psychologists did not go along at all, and the criticisms of behaviorism
are ably discussed in the chapters of this book. As is well pointed out, the criti-
cisms of behaviorism were often misleading. For example, Watson's aim was
not to narrow the focus of psychology but instead to broaden it--to permit
more objective studies in comparative psychology, child psychology, abnor-
mal psychology, and applied psychology--without making unnecessary ref-
erence to unobservables.

The influence of behaviorism went far beyond the creation of a body of
devoted behaviorists. The term behavioral sciences became applied not only
to psychology but also to the other social sciences, as shown, for example, in
the creation of a division in Behavioral Sciences in the Ford Foundation and
the establishing by the Ford Foundation of the Center for Advanced Studies
in the Behavioral Sciences on the lands of Stanford University.

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