After authoritarianism, transitions that could lead toward democracy
or disorder are affected by many factors, principal among which is the
degree of security available to the new systems. Historically, the
genesis of plural, tolerant, and competitive polities has been a long,
conflictual process. During that extended period--decades if not cen-
turies--geographic insulation, inexhaustible resources, or protection
by a larger patron have played a role in ensuring ample capacities with
which to meet threats.

Absent a dynamic balance between threats and capacities, demo-
crats are unlikely to arise, or stay democrats for very long. Unless a
political system's capacities can balance real or perceived threats,
attachment to democratic norms is less than certain in the face of more
urgent needs. Demogogues can appeal to base instincts by arguing that
tenets of democracy such as personal freedoms, rule of law, and social
tolerance are unaffordable luxuries.

Today, threats are multiplying, not subsiding. No longer do we or
our allies concern ourselves about communist subversion, Warsaw Pact
or Soviet-inspired aggression, or similar overt dangers. Instead, fears
of international organized crime, terrorism, ethnic unrest and conflict,
nuclear proliferation, mass migration, and other transnational threats
have become omnipresent, for Europeans, Asians, and people else-
where.

Particularly in Europe, but on other continents as well, the late 1980s
and early 1990s offered an opportunity to inaugurate transitions to

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