Hitler received when he marched into Vienna to announce
Anschluss with his German blood brothers.

As researchers revealed more details about Waldheim's
shadowed past, his membership in Nazi organizations and his
alleged involvement in war crimes, one central question clamored
for answers. How could a man with such a past become secretary
general of the United Nations, head of an organization dedicated
not only to the maintenance of peace but also to the preservation
and advancement of human rights?

This book is the result of our exploration of that question. Our
research reveals that the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain,
and France all had intelligence files on Waldheim's service in the
Balkans with German army units that committed war crimes. Any
of these four countries could have vetoed his appointment as
secretary general, yet none did, neither in 1971, 1976, nor 1981.
Our analysis of the American position is based on a review of
more than 200 confidential and secret telegrams exchanged be-
tween the U.S. Mission to the United Nations and Washington
that we were able to obtain under the Freedom of Information
Act. Further, we interviewed the then secretary of state and his
top deputies; British, French, and Soviet diplomats who had been
involved in the election process; scores of other diplomats, former
diplomats, and Secretariat officials; and Waldheim himself-
altogether more than one hundred interviews. These provided
new insights on how and why Waldheim was elected. They also
illuminated the election process itself.

We explored in depth Waldheim's performance as secretary
general. Our book first probes the powers and latent powers of that
office, as well as its limitations, through a brief historical analysis
of the way the five secretaries general -- Lie, Hammarskjöld, Thant,
Waldheim, and Perez de Cuellar -- have carried out their roles.
This provides a basis for evaluating Waldheim's performance and
the political context in which he performed. We also investigated
charges that he was blackmailed by the Soviets, the British, and
the Yugoslavs on the basis of their knowledge of his wartime
record, but found no evidence of actual blackmail. We did find,
however, that in his efforts to please everybody (he was
sometimes referred to as "the headwaiter"), Waldheim yielded
readily to pressure from all sides. Much as he had done when the

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