| | that there are brute facts has no greater intellectual authority than the view that there are not, since it cannot be rationally adjudicated against it. It can be, only, preferred, the way you prefer one flavour of ice cream to another. An alternative line of thought is that vocabularies and lan- guage games are commensurable. I hope so. Because it doesn't make a whole lot of difference precisely how the world is lost, whether quickly as in (1), or just a bit more slowly as in (2). Either way, if the facts are wholly internalized to the lan- guage game, the implications are not good. If there is no truth, there is no injustice. Morally and politically anything goes. There are appalling language games always in preparation somewhere, now as much as ever. They will be 'played' by those looking for the chance of it in deadly earnest. It remains to be shown that, amongst our defences against them, we have anything better than the concepts of a common human- ity, of universal rights, and of reasoning together to try to discover how things are, in order to minimize avoidable suffering and injustice. Notes Bibliographical details for the works of Rorty referred to here, and the abbreviations used for them, may be found at p. 147. | 1. | Primo Levi, Moments of Reprieve, London 1986, pp. 149-50; and Primo Levi, The Drowned and the Saved, London 1989, pp. 127-8. | | | | | 2. | Hilary Putnam, "'Why Reason Can't Be Naturalized'", in Kenneth Baynes , ed., After Philosophy: End or Transformation?, Cambridge, Mass. 1987, p. 228. | | | | | 3. | J. L. Austin, Sense and Sensibilia, Oxford 1962, p. 2. | | | | | 4. | See Chapter 2, subsection I (a), and notes 4-8. | | | | | 5. | CoP, pp. xxix-xxx. | | | | | 6. | ORT, pp. 99-100. | | | | | 7. | CoP, p. xxxvii. | | | | | 8. | TrF, p. 633. | | | | | 9. | CoP, pp. 136-7; ORT pp. 148-9. | | | | | 10. | WAR, p. 42. | | | | | 11. | ORT, p. 99; EHO, p. 4. | | | | | 12. | PMN, p. 371; CoP, p. 67 (and ORT, p. 155); CoP, p. 16. | | | | -143- | |