B Y the end of February 1960 there were many symptoms
indicating that Khrushchev's famous "peasant common
sense" is not strong enough to save him from the occupational
disease of dictators. The contradictions between his over-
ambitious and not well-founded schemes in industry and
agriculture on the one hand, and between the realities and
possibilities of the Soviet situation on the other, grew more
evident during the winter of 1959-60. A long list of agricultural
and industrial managers and loyal top-apparatchiki were
deposed by him. In the background of each sudden demotion
there was either a disagreement on concrete questions of
industrial or agricultural policy, or a major difficulty or even
breakdown in the virgin lands campaign, industrial reorganisa-
tion, or some other important project. Many trusted "Khrush-
chev-men" were simply unable to succeed with one of the
dictator's unrealistic projects.

January 1960 brought the surprising news of the quick and
drastic demotion of two of the most loyal Khrushchev sup-
porters: Nikolai Belyayev and Alexey Kirichenko. Their cases
are the best illustrations of the present problems of top-
apparatchiki: they either resist Khrushchev's unrealistic
projects and become "expert-oppositionists" or fail to put them
into practice and get fired.

Belyayev was K.'s chief assistant in the 1954-55 virgin lands
campaign. In 1955 he became a Cent-Com secretary and in
1957, as Presidium member, was the main agricultural
manager. He also became first secretary of Kazakhastan, the
"virgin lands republic". In January 1960 he was demoted to
the secretaryship of the Stavropol region, for "failing in
Kazakhastan". Khrushchev said: "Friendship is friendship, but
work is work". But was it Belyayev who had failed and not
K.'s virgin lands campaign?

In November 1956, K. publicly rebuked Mikoyan for doubt-
ing that Kazakhastan would produce a milliard pood of grain

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