illustrate our view of the soul as a link or focus, through
which the striving of the universe unites the multitude of
things and persons in the absolute whole. This concep-
tion determines the treatment of the soul in these lectures.
We shall first consider, in the following lecture, how the
distinctness of particular persons, though practically a fact,
shows indications of an underlying unity not generally
recognised. After that, we shall consider the soul and its
destiny under three principal heads. First, the idea of
"soul-making" as the work of the universe, borrowed from
Keats, will lead us to speak of the moulding of souls by
natural and social selection, and of their self-creation
through the miracle of will. Secondly, the life of the
finite self in apparent self-completeness and independence,
will show itself to be one of suffering and adventure.
And, thirdly, as far as through such adventure the soul
is driven to self-recognition, or knowledge of its own true
nature and dependence in the religious consciousness, the
secret of stability and security, even for the finite self, will
be revealed. This consciousness is closely akin to the
best things in knowledge; but philosophy depends on it
rather than vice versa, and it is natural to the healthy
mind, as Spinoza says.

THE aim of this lecture is to prepare us for a freer dealing
with the distinction between different persons than is com-
monly held permissible. No one wants to deny it is a fact;
but it is important to recognise what sort of fact it is, and that
it presents indications of not being ultimate and irreducible.
The common conviction is that the most "personal" part
of us is the least capable of being shared or communicated.
I am I and not you, because you cannot have my feelings
just as I have them, especially my bodily feelings. We

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