Both of these conceptions might illustrate our
point of view. We think of the soul as, on the
one hand, a nisus towards unity on the part of a
world on its own level or below it; on the other
hand as an element contributing to the absolute,
isolated only in appearance by an impotence ¹ which
constitutes its finiteness.

In conjoining the essences of these descriptions
I do not think that we are liable to a charge of
dualism. The natural is necessary to the spiritual,
and nothing is to be gained by minimising the dis-
tinction between them so long as it is clear that
their difference is such as to promote a complete
identity. Thus when we maintain that conscious-
ness actually works in and through the systematic
adaptation of a certain type of matter, we are
not really adopting any one of the three dual-
istic doctrines, parallelism, interaction, epiphenom-
enalism. ² It is a different thing to say that con-
sciousness, as the universal susceptibility, appears
within certain special transactions on the part of
matter, when highly organised and systematised; and
to say that it forms a separate and isolated entity,
whether as a parallel series or as an interacting
subject, or as an epiphenomenal effect which has no
reaction. The point, as it appears to me, is that
in all these theories consciousness is conceived
on intentionally dualistic lines, as a repetition or
duplication of neurosis in a different medium, or
within a different attribute. Neurosis is taken as
in space; and psychosis as the same thing over

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