hands of the Germans. What had happened and was happening in
countries like Poland and Czechoslovakia furnished a warning of what
German rule could be like. The French Government dared not ignore it.
Of no inconsiderable importance, either, was the fact that products from
the occupied zone were indispensable to the existence of the unoccupied
zone, poor agriculturally and industrially. An interruption of the north-
south traffic could have the gravest of consequences.

On the other hand, there was an unoccupied zone under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the French Government which preserved the attributes of
sovereignty. Unlike other countries defeated by Germany, France main-
tained diplomatic relations with other nations, even when they were at
war with Germany. Besides, the French Government had, at least in
theory, the right to exercise its authority even over the occupied zone,
inasmuch, of course, as it did not conflict with the "rights of the
occupying power," granted to Germany by Article III of the Franco-
German armistice. The French Government was also allowed to maintain
full control over the French empire, which the armistices left intact and
free from occupation. ⁴ This gave the French real strength in their
negotiations with the Axis powers, which were always afraid of seeing
the French empire pass over to the Allies; it also helped them in their
dealings with the English and the Americans, for they were very desirous
of keeping the French possessions out of Axis hands. Indeed, the empire
offered great military advantages. French North Africa, in particular,
was of vital strategic importance, as the Allied landings there were to
demonstrate; Dakar was one of the best air and submarine bases in the
South Atlantic; Madagascar was on the Cape route to India; Syria lay
at Egypt's rear; the French Pacific islands were vital outposts in the
Far East.

The armistices left another asset of great value in France's hands
and one which was also going to play a role in the months to come:
the French fleet. Hitler, in spite of Mussolini's insistence, had refused
to ask for it, fearing that such a demand would "cause an uprising of
the French navy in favor of the English." ⁵ Consequently, the famous
Article VIII simply provided that:

The French War Fleet, with the exception of the part left at the
disposal of the Government for the protection of French interests in
its colonial empire, will be assembled in harbors to be determined and
will be demobilized and disarmed under the control of Germany or Italy,
respectively. The peacetime home ports will determine the choice of
the harbors. ⁶

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