There was one obvious danger in this clause: the "home ports" of most of the warships were on the Atlantic coast, i.e. in occupied territory. But, as we shall see, a few days after the signature of the armistices, the application of this clause was suspended and the French were able to preserve their control over their fleet until it was scuttled in November 1942. If the Pétain Government had these assets to ensure it a minimum of independence, they were nothing in comparison to the means of pressure which the Germans possessed. In addition to the occupation of a good part of France, they held almost two million French war prisoners, who, according to Article XX, were to be released only at the conclusion of peace. 7 They constituted an excellent instrument of blackmail. and promises of liberation of prisoners and threats of worsening their treat- ment were used regularly; both methods proved to be equally successful in dealing with Vichy. Another means of pressure was the threat of denouncing the armis- tices. Article XXIV of the Franco-German convention provided: The present Armistice Convention is valid until the conclusion of the peace treaty. It can be denounced at any time, so that it will be terminated immediately by the German Government if the French Govern- ment does not fulfill its obligations undertaken by it in the present Convention. 8
A denunciation of the armistices would be a grave matter, for it would entail not only the loss of the advantages they brought France, but a resumption of hostilities. For that, France was not at all prepared. The armistices left her nothing to fight with. According to Article IV. 9 French troops were to be demobilized and disarmed, with the exception of a small lightly-armed force to preserve internal order; Articles V, VI, VII, IX, XIII 10 provided that war matériel should be handed over or stocked, that planes should be disarmed and stocked, 11 that mines should be removed. With their well-trained, well-armed troops at the Demarcation Line, the Germans were in a position to invade and occupy the free zone without difficulty and to destroy the French Government. Yet if the armistices seemed to the French worth preserving, they could hardly be said to offer an ideal solution. While they permitted a limited existence to the French people, they certainly put France in an ____________________ | 10 | of the Franco-German armistice. See Articles V, X, XI, XIII, XVIII of the Franco-Italian armistice. | | 11 | This was the only concession obtained by the French during the Rethondes negotiations (the original text provided for the handing over of the planes). | | 7 | There was no such clause in the Franco-Italian armistice because, during the brief campaign against France, Italy had been able to capture only one officer and 136 men ( Pierre Limagne, Ephémérides de Quatre Années Tragi- ques ( Paris, 1945, 1946, 1947, 1948), vol. I, p. 332). | | 8 | Article XXVI of the Franco-Italian armistice was identical. | | 9 | of the Franco-German armistice. | -15- |