be established. It is, therefore, proper to in-
quire whether or not the basic concepts un-
derlying causation research are adequate.

The very foundation of studies in crime
causation rests upon the definition of "crime"
and "criminal." They are the subject matter
of traditional criminology. Both are defined
by law, but while the limitations which such
definition imposes upon research has been
lamented by the criminologist, it has not been
seriously questioned. Even such astute critics
of criminological research as Michael and
Adler stated:

We cannot make empirical investigations of
crime and criminals unless we have some basis
for differentiating criminal from other be-
havior and criminals from other persons, which
is so precise and definite that we will not
confuse them in our observations. . . . The
most precise and least ambiguous definition of
crime is that which defines it as behavior
which is prohibited by the criminal code. . . .
Not only is the legal definition of a crime pre-
cise and unambiguous, but it is the only pos-
sible definition of crime. ³

These authors go even further in their in-
terpretation of the concepts under discussion.
While they recognize that a person who
violates the criminal law thereby becomes a
criminal, they add that "the most certain
way . . . to distinguish criminals from non-
criminals is in term of those who have been
convicted of crime and those who have not.
. . . Both for practical and for theoretical
purposes we must proceed as if that were
true. . . . The criminologist is therefore quite
justified in making the convict population the
subject of his studies as he does." ⁴

In a footnote in another section of their
work, however, they raised a question which
should be noted here and which they made no
attempt to answer: "One of the crucial prob-
lems which confronts the criminologist is
whether this manner of distinguishing criminals
from non-criminals is significant for his pur-
poses." ⁵ In designating this problem as a "cru-
cial" one, the authors were undoubtedly right.
It is the crucial problem. It is, furthermore,
one to which little attention has been paid by
criminologists. Criminology has become the
study of crimes and criminals. The social de-
mand for crime prevention and repression, the
apparent precision of the legal definitions, and
the availability of concrete data, collected dur-
ing the law enforcement process have all aided
in fixing the artificial boundaries of criminol-
ogy. Such boundaries can not be recognized
by science. Yet, specialization, a division of
labor, is obviously necessary in research. "The
scientific study of any field of phenomena,"
to quote George Catlin, "requires the general
delimitation of that field," but that delimita-
tion must "arise intrinsically from the nature
of the subject matter and [must] not be of
a purely fortuitous nature, based on some
merely external similarities in what is ob-
served." ⁶ The legal definitions which circum-
scribe criminological research fall into the class
of "external similarities" mentioned. Criminol-
ogists have defined the phenomena, which they
study "in terms of the most available . . .
[data] thereby stultifying . . . [their] entire
theoretical concepts," to paraphrase a state-
ment by Frank Ross. ⁷ We shall attempt to
show that the categories set up by the crim-
inal law do not meet the demands of scientists
because they are of "a fortuitous nature" and
do not "arise intrinsically from the nature of
the subject matter."

Among the various instrumentalities which
social groups have evolved to secure con-
formity in the conduct of their members, the
criminal law occupies an important place, for
its norms are binding upon all who live within
the political boundaries of a state and are en-
forced through the coercive power of that
state. The criminal law may be regarded as
in part a body of rules, which prohibit specific
forms of conduct and indicate punishments for
violations. The character of these rules, the
kind or type of conduct they prohibit, the
nature of the sanction attached to their viola-
tion, etc. depend upon the character and in-
terests of those groups in the, population which
influence legislation. In some states these

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