this is a point rather of comparative than of practical im-
portance. It would be otherwise if all the Smiths, however
remotely related, formed a definite social unit set over
against the rest of the community, e.g., if in the inheritance
of property the most remote kinsman of the same family
name took precedence of such close relatives as married
daughters or the sons of sisters. Since one-sided empha-
sis on the paternal branch of the family is not in vogue with
us apart from the transmission of the name, we are justi-
fied in describing our family as an essentially bilateral one.

The question, then, that concerns us above all others is
whether primitive tribes similarly recognize the bilateral
principle in their conception of family life. Whenever they
do, we shall be justified in holding that they recognize the
family as a social unit regardless of whatever other units
may coëxist with it. Let us then first consider the evidence
for the presence of the bilateral principle and next pass in
review some of the more important factors that tend to
mould primitive family life, often causing it to deviate ap-
preciably from the West European norm.

Objective testimony of quite incontrovertible character is
furnished on behalf of the universality of the family unit
by the recorded systems of kinship terminology. As even
Morgan pointed out in a discussion with McLennan, every
tribe has terms of relationship for both the paternal and
the maternal lines and in so far acknowledges bilateral kin-
ship. But to limit this attitude to the matter of nomencla-
ture would be to understate the case beyond all reason. In
by far the majority of primitive tribes both sides of the
family are reckoned with not only in vocabulary but in cus-
tomary law, definite functions being commonly associated
with definite types of relationship. Thus, the Hopi unlike
ourselves are matronymic since what corresponds to our

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