ultimate values, and an adequate appreciation of the relative
worth and mutual compatibility of various goods. (This
"intuition," or appreciation, it should be stated, is a matter of
feeling and will, and not of reason alone.) If the good end is to
be intelligently chosen, then, there must be an appreciation of
the superior worth of absolute and permanent values, as com-
pared with such as are but instrumental and temporary. But
more than this is necessary. On the basis of an appreciation of
the absolute value (potential, if not actual) of all personal life,
the goods appreciated as absolute must be desired for all per-
sons, and their greatest possible ultimate well-being made the
end of individual action. That is wrong conduct in which some-
thing less than the greatest total true good of all persons is made
the end of action. Lack of appreciation of the highest (i. e., the
absolute and eternal) goods, as compared with those the appre-
ciation of which calls for less spiritual development, may be
called sensuousness. It is being guided by animal impulse,
rather than by the highest ideals. On the other hand, lack of
appreciation of the equal rights of others to be regarded as
ends, instead of being used as mere means, is selfishness.

But fully right conduct must not only aim at the highest
possible good of all concerned; it must employ the best available
means for realizing these imperative ends. What the best means
are must be discovered ultimately by empirical methods-
observation and experiment. For conduct is sometimes wrong
through ignorance of the best means to employ in order to
realize ends rightly recognized as valid.

But it often happens that wrong conduct is not due to ig-
norance alone or principally, Socrates to the contrary not-
withstanding. Even when there is correct information as to the
sequence of cause and effect, and therewith as to the right means
to employ in order to realize desired ends, often the right action
does not follow. It is not that the intellect is mistaken, but that
the will is bad. Nor is this always due to the individual's nature
having not yet learned to appreciate the higher values, although
this is often a factor. Neither is it enough in all cases to point
to an unfortunate inheritance of instinct, or to the fact of long
habituation to an inadequate way of acting, or to the individual
will being overborne by social pressure, i. e., temptation of one

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