reflective consciousness; and secondly, such general
distinctions in the material element, the feelings
themselves, as are at once the most obvious and
the most comprehensive, such as, first, the distinc-
tions between the feelings themselves, as sight and
sound, taste and smell, love and hatred, and, secondly,
such as the distinction between feelings which have
a special and definite character of their own, which
they never lose, and feelings which, while they never
exist separately, will combine with or enter into any
others and, on so doing, take upon them a colour
from those with which they combine; to which latter
class belong pleasure and pain, and the sense of effort
with its derivatives. The applicability however of
all these distinctions can only be shown by their
proving themselves capable, in the event, of serving
to arrange the phenomena in a complete and satis-
factory manner; for the method is not pure deduc-
tion, but examination of an already existing complex
object.

2. The mass of feelings is thus traversed by a
number of distinctions which are the first outlines
of its classification and analysis; but these distinc-
tions cross each other, so that what is entirely in-
cluded in one category of one of the distinctions is
either only partly included, or included along with
something else, in a similar category of some other
distinction. For instance, the distinction of presen-
tation and representation serves to distinguish sen-
sation from emotion, but the distinction between
general and special feelings, that is, between plea-
sure, pain, and effort, on one side, and such feelings
as hunger, warmth, love, anger, on the other, applies
equally to both sensations and emotions; that is,

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