subjective, and its truth consists in the exactness
with which it renders the objects and events of pre-
sentative perception. The distinction between object
and subject falls here entirely beyond the train of
representations, falls between that train and the ob-
jects of presentation which it represents. But, within
this train of representations itself, the place formerly
occupied by the distinction between object and sub-
ject is now occupied by another distinction, that be-
tween the representations themselves and the emo-
tions which they excite, these emotions being new
feelings aroused in us by the representations, deriv-
ing their character from them, and answering by
minutely corresponding changes of emotion to every
change in the representations which cause them.
The emotions thus depend immediately upon the
representations, mediately upon the objects of pre-
sentation which they reproduce; and that which the
presented objects, or real things, are to the repre-
sentations, these again in their turn are to the emo-
tions, namely, comparatively real objects to feelings
which are out and out subjective. Such I apprehend
to be the current view.

2. Now it is true that emotions arise first in re-
presentation. Representation first completes the for-
mation of remote objects of perception, the common
objects which we see and hear and feel around us,
which consist of presentative perceptions gathered
up and combined into portions of space and of time
in the way which it was attempted to describe in
"Time and Space" § 26. Then first, on this having
been done, a new set of feelings is disclosed, of feel-
ings inhering in or attached to these objects, all which
feelings are, by themselves, in the form of time only

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