2. Now when sensations and representations like
those mentioned are attached to objects which are
separate from the body of the person feeling them,
so as to be capable of approaching and removing
from it, it is proper to describe the emotions as aver-
sion and fondness; when they arise within the body
itself, then it is proper to describe them as grief and
joy. Even in this their simplest shape these emo-
tions admit of as many differences in kind as there
are differences in the sensations or groups of sensa-
tion, in representing which they arise; and of course
also of innumerable differences of degree or intensity.
But they do not depend upon imagination, upon the
expectation of a future feeling, a feeling different in
mode of combination from what has been already
actually experienced; nor yet upon reflection, upon
the distinction between the self and its modes of
feeling. It is true that there is a joy and grief, an
aversion and fondness, in reflection; pleasure and
pain of all kinds when contemplated in representa-
tion are grief, joy, aversion, and fondness, of that
particular kind to which their representational frame-
work belongs; and grief and joy, aversion and fond-
ness, are properly defined as the representation of
the pain or pleasure of enjoyment in any object,
whether direct or reflective, a thing or a person.
In reflection it is emotions themselves which, when
contemplated as pleasureable or painful, are the ob-
jects or frameworks of the reflective modes of joy
or grief, fondness or aversion. For instance, the
pleasure of being loved, when represented, is joy;
the pain of humiliation, when represented, is grief.
There is pleasure in being loved, and a further plea-
sure in the thought or representation of it; there

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