between the living body as the abode of feeling, the
man or mind himself, and all objects which are not
included in that sentient body, that is, between the
mind and its objects. Now on these perceptions it
is that all the reflective emotions depend; if these
perceptions did not exist, neither could those emo-
tions, since their frameworks would be altered. The
combination of these perceptions with these emotions
is a part of the analysis, meaning, or content, of the
emotions; just as, on any psychological theory, the
previous existence of the objects of these perceptions
would be among their causes or conditions of exist-
ence.

2. Now all emotions arise in representation of
objects of sensation; and the foregoing remarks will
help us to discover in what kind of these objects the
emotions of the kind now in question arise. They
arise only in those objects in which we perceive or
infer traces of a personality or self, either our own
or like our own, which we have already learnt to
distinguish in reflection. When we stand by other
men, we infer from their actions, from the changes
of their appearance in sight or sound or other sen-
sation, that they feel and think and reflect as we do,
that their bodies are the abodes of consciousness just
as our own are; and it is not only the more obvious
among external actions or changes, such as gesture
and speech, which lead us to infer this, but count-
less minute actions which arise from emotions of the
more delicate and impalpable kinds; and this is the
only mode I can think of in which we become aware
of the existence of other minds or persons; it is a
process of reasoning and inference from the second
of the two distinctions mentioned above, that be-

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