benefited; the reverse is the case with those we
hate, and at their ill fortune we feel joy or con-
gratulation, a feeling which becomes ἐπιχαιξεϰαϰία, or
general rejoicing at ill, when there is a tendency to
regard most men as enemies, a feeling which allies
this group of antipathetic emotions with those of
envy and jealousy; and on the other hand their good
fortune inspires us with regret and vexation. Pity
does not directly depend upon the imagination that
the evil might happen to oneself; the connection
with self is given already in the circumstance that
the person whom we pity is the object of a sympa-
thetic emotion, is already a friend or ally. In other
words, the emotion of pity is not derived from self-
love, or from an imagination of the same case being
possibly one's own, as distinguished from others',
as if only what pleased or pained self, in this sense,
was of interest to us. Aristotle seems to leave this
question open in the words,

§ 28. 1. I turn now to the passions which arise
in and belong to these emotions, and which are in-

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