others, with those of another person, and find our-
selves come short in contrast with him, find also
figure to ourselves that he is also aware of the same
contrast, favourable to him but unfavourable to us,
the emotions which we feel may be described under
the general name of ashamedness towards ourselves
and of admiration of externals towards him; when
the contrast is equally great but the advantage is
on our side, we feel some mode of vanity towards
ourselves and some kind of contempt towards him.
There are no appropriate single names for the two
emotions first mentioned, probably because, being
painful, they do not become passions, and thus are
not so much noticed. Vanity however and contempt,
which arise from the favourable comparison and are
therefore pleasant, are indulged and thus become
passions, for which reason they are most prominent
and their names current. Yet passion and emotion
always go hand in hand, and there is no passion
which is not founded in some emotion, nor any emo-
tion which does not give rise to some passion, though
if the emotion is painful the passion will not be the
simple completion of the emotion; in this case the
passion is the irritable desire not to increase but to
lessen or escape from the emotion in which it arises;
and in the case of the two emotions first mentioned,
ashamedness and admiration of externals, it will as-
sume some form of antipathetic emotion, illwill, or
hate, towards the person in contrast with ourselves.
Vanity has been defined as the desire of pleasing;
it is rather the desire of exciting the emotion of com-
parison favourable to ourselves in matters of external
show and advantage; the desire of pleasing is an
euphemism; there is no goodwill in vanity except

-210-