to be added to that of existence? Is it not clear
that this deduction of right to exist from existence
itself is a later growth, a reflection upon the fact of
existence, and a reference of the two categories, right
and existence, to each other, when each has been
formed and is ready to hand? The purpose of meta-
physical analysis, however, is to show the origin, the
first nature, of the notion of right, not to take it up
ready formed, as if implied in the notion of existence.
The very assertion, that existence is a right, shows
that the two terms have a meaning of their own
before they are connected in a proposition. Before
you can predicate food of bread, you must have a
meaning in the term food as well as in the term
bread. And this applies to all cases where the terms
are not in all possible respects coextensive, or where
the proposition is not what is called an identical once.

2. The first origin of the notion of just and right,
in this as in the previous case, comes from the shock
of deceived expectation in suffering the unjust and
the wrong. A hunter kills or traps game, a new set-
tier encloses and digs a field, in the expectation of
enjoying them; another person steps in and takes
away his game or tramples down his corn; the abrupt
break between his expectation and the actual result,
caused by a person, is his emotion of injustice and
wrong, not because he refers the act to the violation
of a supposed law of right or just, which would
imply that he had either an "innate idea" or a
previously formed notion of right or justice, but
because he distinguishes the circumstance of shock
to expectation from the quality, the hurtfulness to
him, of the act. The incongruity between expecta-
tion and fulfilment is, then, at first the sole content

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