the two central conceptions comprised several points;
1st, the new conception involved a change from an
objective to a subjective point of view, from habits,
ἕξεις, characters, and circumstances gratifying them,
to emotions and thoughts, thus making the agent
himself the inappealable tribunal of action; 2nd, it
involved a conception of Duty or obligation compel-
ling or binding, instead of a Happiness attracting,
the will; 3rd, it placed the criterion of goodness at
the beginning instead of at the end of action, making
the judgment intuitive instead of tentative; and 4th,
it rested on an analysis which took account of newly
discovered facts of consciousness, facts at any rate
not attended to before as of so much importance, and
so figuratively speaking deeper, as if evolved from a
greater depth. The last point contained the cause of
the passing from the one view to the other. Certain
emotions had received a new intensity for some minds,
and in their lower degrees of intensity had become
sensible to a greater number of minds; the terms
expressing them had become current, and questions
connected with them had become more widely inte-
resting. These emotions belonged to the domain of
religion; and the relations of man to the unseen
world of religious objects had become more clear and
more complicated, coordinately and simultaneously
with the intensifying the corresponding emotions.
Hence an entire Theology arose, the nature and func-
tions of the actors in which were conceived by ana-
logy with, and described in terms drawn from, the
temporal sovereignty and its ministers, in their ad-
ministrative and judicial functions. The emotions of
remorse and of self-approval, when supposed to be
ratified by an all-seeing and all-powerful judge, of

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