This metaphor for social systems also describes research systems. Here, I distinguish between research systems that are like clocks and those that are like clouds. Business ethics research is more cloud-like than clock-like. From a distance, it appears to be a singular, solid, substantial thing. But, up close, it is fuzzy, flexible, and organic. One of the greatest strengths of business ethics research lies in the diwrsity of those interested in knowing more about it. Where else could we find moral philosophers, industrial psychologists, political scientists, management scholars, and organizational sociologists all exploring the same issue? Schol- ars from these and other disciplines bring to the table an intriguing mix of skills and perspectives. In doing so, they reflect a common interest in ques- tions regarding business, ethics, and the relationship between the two. How- ever, with this strength also comes a weakness. Researchers from such di- verse backgrounds often find it difficult to communicate with one another in meaningful ways. Nowhere has this been more true than with business ethics. Several recent essays address the natural conflicts that arise between those with different perspectives on the field. Most of this work echoes two central themes, and those themes compose the agenda for this volume. First, how might we best integrate the two very different areas -- philosophy and social science -- that provide the foundation for the field? Second, how might we create closer ties between business ethics research and real business settings? THE FIRST CHALLENGE: INTEGRATING PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL SCIENCE Business ethics research consists of two distinct subdisciplines. One, primar- ily descriptive and based in the social sciences, addresses the question of "what is." The other, primarily normative (or prescriptive) and based in moral philosophy, addresses the question of "what ought to be." Historically, these two approaches represented distinct areas of inquiry, and recent works point to a number of issues that inhibit efforts to integrate them: fear, pur- pose, and background. For example, Victor and Stephens ( 1994) pointed out that historically, philosophy and social science have exhibited a sort of division of labor with respect to business ethics. Philosophers address normative issues; social scientists, descriptive ones. However, forces in each area impede attempts to integrate the two. For example, philosophers fear a creeping "naturalistic fallacy" in the face of advancing empiricism. That is, they fear that discoveries of what is may come to define our thinking of what ought to be. Similarly, social scientists express concern over breaking ranks with a positivist tradi- tion, which asserts that facts are distinct from values. If truth cannot carry -2- |