associates to continue to supply oil and other essential materials to
Japan.

The stubborn will of the Japanese government to retain the control
in China which it had achieved by force of arms he attributes
primarily to the will of the Japanese Army. That military organiza-
tion was able to dictate the fate of the nation because of the mode
of arriving at official decisions, its appeal to the Japanese people,
its close alliance with Japanese industry and the Japanese press, and
its readiness to resort to threat and assassination. Correcting the
prevailing view, his account reveals that the Japanese Navy was not
steadfast in its opposition to the measures which resulted in the war;
after the imposition of the oil embargo it also became inclined to
favor resort to war rather than a compromising retreat.

The author's assessment of the importance of the economic sanctions
to which Japan was subjected by the American government and its
associates is justified. However, I have the impression that he does
not take into due account the ways and degree to which the successive
Japanese military advances and threats endangered the prospects of
victory or defeat of the countries fighting the Axis, nor of the fact
that the imported oil and other materials were being used by the
Japanese government either for training for war, the enlargement
and equipment of Japanese military forces, or as reserve stocks for
use in war. The American government, aware of the scope of Japanese
expansionary aims, could hardly continue to provide the means by
which, if the clash of purposes came to war, the Japanese would
kill our people and perhaps defeat us.

Professor Lu, after close scrutiny and consideration, concludes that
the Tripartite Pact "played an insignificant role in Japan's decision
for war, since the Pact had the Soviet Union, rather than
the United States, as its primary target." To this conclusion I must
dissent. When in September 1940, the time of utmost anxiety about
British survival and the outcome of the war, Japan entered in this
alliance with Germany and Italy, it enlisted in the group of aggressors
in order to share in the expected spoils of their assault. By doing
so, it lost the right to helpful treatment of its economic needs and
its reasons for complaint against China. Moreover, the American
official impressions of the inclinations and intentions of the Japanese
government were sustained by the refusal of the Japanese govern-
ment to disassociate itself from the Pact, to do more than give
ambiguous hints that it might or might not be faithful to its obligations
at a time of crisis depending on whether it would gain or lose by

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