policy-making, and the factors that influenced their decisions. The
degree of coordination attained between the diverse elements of the
Govermnent can be judged from these documents. Research was
further supplemented by official documents of the U. S. Government
and of Germany, as well as Tokyo War Trials documents. The work
also draws on numerous memoirs which appeared in Japan and
in this country after the war. As much as possible, memoirs and
Tokyo Trials documents are checked against the Archive materials
to ascertain their accuracy and credibility.

The author is, of course, indebted to many excellent scholarly
works on the same period or subject. Professor Robert Butow
Tojo and the Coming of the War was published while this book
was already on proofs. The two works are essentially complementary
in nature. Unlike the Butow volume, this study is not primarily
concerned with assessing Tojo's responsibility in the decision for war.

This study is probably alone in its interpretation of the anti-Soviet
nature of the Tripartite Pact, in casting Matsuoka's diplomacy in a
more favorable light, in defining the role played by the Navy in the
decision for war and in other matters uncovered from documentary
sources which were once believed to be burned in the Tokyo air raid.

The author wishes to thank his many colleagues at Bucknell,
Professor Nathaniel Peffer of Columbia University, President Hugh
Borton of Haverford, and Mr. M. B. Schnapper of the Public Affairs
Press for encouragement; Messrs. William T. Fox, Leland M. Good-
rich, Franklin L. Ho, James W. Morley, Herschel Webb, C. Martin
Wilbur, and Dr. Allen Whiting for reading the manuscript at its
various stages and offering helpful suggestions; and Messrs. John
Hunt and Andrew Kuroda of the Library of Congress and Mrs.
Zagayko and Mr. Howard Linton of Columbia libraries for their
patience. Last but not least, the author is grateful to his wife,
Annabelle, for tirelessly typing most of the manuscript, providing
useful editorial comments and proof-reading. To her and to the
three little ones who would otherwise have received more attention,
this book is dedicated.

In a sense Pearl Harbor was an inevitable sequel to the breakdown
of the balance of power established by the Washington Conference
in 1922. Thus the narrative of this book begins at an incident that
took place shortly after 1922.

DAVIS J. LU

Bucknell University
Lewisburg, Pennsylvania

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